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I. INTRODUCTION
Berle and Means’s analysis of the corporation—in particular, their
view that those in control are not the owners of the corporation—raises
questions about actions that corporations take to counter concerns regarding management’s influence. What mechanisms, if any, do corporations implement to balance the distribution of power in the corporation?
To address this question, we analyze boards of directors’ propensity to
voluntarily adopt recommended corporate governance practices. Because board independence is one way to enhance shareholders’ ability to
monitor management, we probe whether firms with independent boards
of directors (which we define as boards with either an independent chair
or a majority of independent directors) are more likely than firms without
independent boards to adopt these practices. We focus on boards’ willingness to monitor their firms’ agents, examining the relationship between board independence and the voluntary adoption of corporate governance guidelines.
This study relies on a novel, hand-collected dataset drawn from information circulars for approximately 1200 firms listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) and contained in the TSX/S&P index during the
years 1999 to 2003. We collected information on firms’ corporate governance practices, on board composition, and on the ownership structure of the firms’ shareholdings. Although widely held firms are predominant in the United States, Canada and many other countries have rela-
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tively large proportions of family-owned and majority-controlled firms.1
As a result, we controlled for the presence of large shareholders and
identified whether they are executive, family, or institutional investors.
Other control variables include firm financial characteristics, year of observation, and whether the firm’s stock is cross-listed on a U.S. exchange.
Canada provides the ideal environment for undertaking this inquiry
because Canadian law has historically made corporate governance the
responsibility of the board of directors. Until 2004, Canada relied solely
on a best practices approach to governance in which the TSE set forth
recommendations but did not require that firms implement those practices; TSE required only that firms disclose those practices. The voluntary
nature of the Canadian governance guidelines and the responsibility of
the board to respond to these guidelines allow us to examine two things:
first, the extent to which boards vary in their propensity to arm themselves with additional governance tools, and second, whether this variation systematically relates to board independence. As such, the study
contributes to the literature on board behavior and provides valuable insights for regulators on both the effectiveness of voluntary guidelines and
the influence of independent boards.
We show that both independent and non-independent boards voluntarily adopt corporate governance practices designed to enhance their
monitoring capabilities. Voluntary adoption of monitoring mechanisms
across all firms has increased in recent years and it seems that board behavior is similar regardless of whether the board is independent or nonindependent. However, independent boards place special emphasis on
monitoring management through the presence of independent committees. Historically, independent boards have been far more likely to have
independent audit and compensation committees. While more nonindependent boards have begun to maintain independent audit committees, the difference when compared to their independent peers remains
significant, and compensation committees have offered little improvement. An independent board’s ability to adopt additional mechanisms
beyond independent committees is heavily influenced by the presence of
controlling shareholders. When a controlling shareholder is present, the
board emphasizes committee composition and is no more likely than
non-independent boards to adopt other mechanisms. The results suggest
that in many ways, board behavior is similar and that voluntary adoption
of monitoring mechanisms across all firms has increased in recent years.
1. See Peter Klein et al., Corporate Governance, Family Ownership and Firm Value: The
Canadian Evidence, 13 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 769 (2005); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).
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In addition, voluntary adoption appears to increase if the firm is large or
has shares cross-listed in the U.S.
The inconclusive relation between the level of board independence
and firm performance has puzzled both academic researchers and practitioners: while regulators strongly advocate the presence of a majority of
independent directors on company boards, researchers struggle to find
evidence that their presence actually enhances firm performance.2 Based
on the results of this study, perhaps part of the reason that performance
cannot be convincingly linked to board independence lies in the fact that
independent boards act similarly to their non-independent counterparts.
Building on the influential work of Berle and Means,3 Part II reviews the relevant literature used to derive the formal, testable hypothesis that independent boards differ in their propensity to voluntarily adopt
monitoring mechanisms. Part III outlines governance guidelines in Canada, summarizes the shareholding characteristics of the sample firms,
and provides details on the corporate governance guidelines examined in
the study. Part IV describes the empirical methodology used in this
study and sets forth our empirical results and robustness tests. Finally,
Part V discusses the contributions of the study, its limitations, and its
legal implications.

II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A. Agency Costs and the Role of the Board
Researchers and practitioners in economics, finance, and general
management have long used agency theory to describe inherent conflicts
of interest among the various stakeholders of a corporation. Broadly
speaking, agency theory recognizes that managers who have the ability
to make key decisions about the firm’s operations may choose alternatives that directly benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders.
Managers, for instance, may be tempted to divert valuable resources
away from the best interests of the firm and use them for their own personal gain.
Traditionally, agency theory has been viewed as an accurate depiction of the relationship between management and shareholders in widely
held corporations. In such firms, separation of ownership (shareholders)
and control (management) facilitates management’s ability to act in self2. For a summary of this research, see David Finegold et al., Corporate Boards and Company
Performance: Review of Research in Light of Recent Reforms, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 865
(2007).
3. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
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serving ways because individual shareholders hold a relatively small portion of the company’s shares. Typical of the classic Berle and Means
view of the widely held firm, the large number of small shareholders implies that a single small shareholder has neither the power nor the incentive to devote significant resources to monitor management’s behavior
and undertake corrective action when appropriate.4
Although widely held corporations are common in some countries,
such as the United States, different ownership configurations are more
popular in other countries. For example, ownership can be concentrated
in large shareholders such as founding families, executives, or institutional investors.5 Agency theory is also applicable in this context because large shareholders are often either directly or indirectly involved in
managing the affairs of a corporation. As a result, conflicts of interest
can still arise, but they may be driven primarily by the divergence of interests between large and small shareholders. Large shareholders may
prompt management to behave in a way consistent with their own interests at the expense of smaller, minority shareholders. On the other hand,
large shareholders may be better positioned to advocate for valueincreasing changes in firm policy when significant conflicts between
managers and shareholders do arise.6 The loss resulting from these actions and the expense of implementing mechanisms designed to reduce
this opportunistic behavior are described as agency costs.7
Given the prevalence of agency costs across all firms, regardless of
ownership structure, shareholders have devised a variety of ways for attempting to reduce these costs. For example, some corporate governance
techniques include increasing the firm’s debt level to reduce the amount
of cash under management’s discretion,8 creating compensation contracts
aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and managers,9 and relying on the competitiveness of the market for a firm’s products and its
managerial talent.10 Most relevant to the current discussion is the use of

4. See id.; Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
5. See La Porta et al., supra note 1.
6. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 472–74.
7. See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
8. Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323–29 (1986).
9. See Michael Jensen & Kevin Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261–62 (1990).
10. Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 289
(1980).
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the board of directors as an active monitor with the ability to observe
management’s behavior and undertake corrective action as needed.11
Our collective understanding of board processes continues to
evolve with recent research that suggests a stewardship role for directors.
Under this perspective, directors view themselves as actively collaborating with and advising the management of a firm. However, in most situations, directors see such a role as an addition to their more traditional
function as monitors; in this way, directors strive to find a balance between acting as both monitors and advisors to the managerial team.12
B. Independent Directors and Board Monitoring
Because it is important to monitor managers, it is unsurprising that
many studies seek to find ways for the board to improve its performance
of this task. One of the most common recommendations has been to ensure that independent directors are on the firm’s board. These independent directors are unassociated with the firm’s management team and are
free from any business connections linking them with the company. Independent directors may have particularly high incentives to effectively
carry out the monitoring function because their reputation and the value
of their human capital depend on their expertise in this area.13
The idea that independent directors can bring much-needed management oversight to the operations of the board has given rise to advocates for independent boards worldwide. Canadian guidelines initially
recommended board independence (formally defined below) when the
Toronto Stock Exchange adopted the recommendations of the Report of
the Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in
Canada (Dey Committee) in 1995. The U.S. stock exchanges altered
their listing standards to require companies to maintain a majority of independent directors after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
(SOX) in 2002.14 Outside the North American context, international organizations (such as the OECD) and national stock exchanges in many
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Portugal, and Cyprus,
have advocated for board independence. Given the call for independence
from regulators and investors around the globe, many companies have
11. Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON.
301, 311 (1983).
12. See David Anderson et al., The Evolution of Corporate Governance: Power Redistribution
Brings Boards to Life, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 780, 791 (2007); Renee Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 218 (2007).
13. Fama, supra note 10.
14. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was passed in 2002, it was not until 2003 that the Securities and Exchange Commission approved changes to the governance requirements of the United
States’ stock exchanges. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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responded. U.S. corporations have recently experienced significant increases in board independence,15 and although this trend has been
somewhat slower in other countries, the rate of adoption of independent
boards is nevertheless becoming significant around the world. For example, a majority of Irish firms maintain independent boards, as do the
largest Greek firms.16 Moving beyond a single country analysis, Dahya,
Dimitrov, and McConnell examined the prevalence of independent
boards in a cross-country study of firms from twenty-two countries and
showed that the pervasiveness of adopting independent boards is truly
global in nature.17
It has been widely debated whether boards with independent directors actually act as better monitors. If boards with a relatively high proportion of independent members are better boards, then we should expect
this difference to be reflected in the firm’s performance. However, research linking board structure and firm performance remains inconclusive, and studies have failed to find that having a majority of independent
directors results in improved firm financial performance.18
C. Board Processes vs. Performance Outcome
Because explorations of board composition and firm outcomes have
provided inconclusive results, this paper proposes an alternative method
to evaluate whether boards with a significant number of independent directors differ from non-independent boards in their propensity to monitor
managerial behavior and reduce agency costs. This approach is unique
in that it focuses on board actions rather than on firm outcomes such as
performance, which can be largely influenced by factors outside of managerial or board control. Instead, our approach examines whether independent boards are more likely to adopt additional tools to assist them in
their monitoring function. If independent directors have greater incentives to act as diligent monitors,19 we would expect that they would equip
15. See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, The Changing Structure of U.S. Corporate
Boards: 1997–2003, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 1215 (2007); Sharon Lee & Loring Carlson, The
Changing Board of Directors: Board Independence in S&P 500 Firms, 11 J. ORG. CULTURE COMM.
& CONFLICT 31 (2007).
16. See Niamh Brennan & Michael McDermott, Alternative Perspectives on Independence of
Directors, 12 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 325 (2004); Lena Tsipouri & Manolis Xanthakis, Can Corporate Governance Be Rated? Ideas Based on the Greek Experience, 12 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 16
(2004).
17. Jay Dahya, Orlin Dimitrov & John McConnell, Dominant Shareholders, Corporate Boards
and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country Analysis, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 73, 74 (2008).
18. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Finegold et al., supra note 2; Klein et
al., supra note 1.
19. Fama & Jensen, supra note 11, at 314–15.
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themselves with additional tools contained in the list of best practices to
facilitate this role. This supposition is formally defined in terms of the
following hypothesis: Firms with independent boards will be more likely
than those without independent boards to voluntarily adopt mechanisms
designed to enhance the board’s capability to monitor management.
This hypothesis can be viewed as an examination of the extent to which
the board processes of independent and non-independent boards are similar. In this way, the research provides insights on the “black box of
board process”20 while also documenting the extent to which firms adopt
voluntary governance mechanisms. In the parts below, we describe the
empirical context and the methodology used to test this hypothesis.

III. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT
Several features of the empirical context warrant discussion. First,
we outline the specifics of the Canadian corporate governance regime,
and then we formally define the board independence used here. Second,
we provide summary statistics on the level of board independence for the
sample firms over the five-year period under study. Third, we examine
shareholder characteristics and the ownership structure of the sample
firms. This examination reveals significant deviation from the common
view of the corporation as a widely held entity. Finally, we describe the
precise monitoring mechanisms that we examined, and we provide summary statistics on their adoption rates.
A. Applicable Regulations Related to Governance and Disclosure in the
Canadian Governance Regime
Canadian law has historically made corporate governance the responsibility of the board of directors, and until recently, Canada relied
solely on voluntary governance guidelines established by the Dey Committee and the responsibility of the board to respond to these guidelines.
An analysis of Canadian corporations therefore allows us to examine
whether boards voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms in
order to assist them in monitoring firm management.
The current Canadian corporate governance regime originated in
1995 when the Toronto Stock Exchange adopted the recommendations of
the Dey Committee Report entitled, Where Were the Directors?21 (“Dey
Report”). Although the TSX set forth these recommendations, corpora20. See Richard Leblanc & Mark Schwartz, The Black Box of Board Process: Gaining Access
to a Difficult Subject, 15 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 843 (2007).
21. TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA,
WHERE WERE THE DIRECTORS? GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA
(1994) [hereinafter Dey Report]. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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tions were not required to implement them; however, each company
listed on the TSX was required to describe in its annual report or information circular whether or not it had adopted the guidelines produced by
the committee. If a company decided not to adopt the recommended
guidelines, it had to disclose the relevant explanation.
From 1995 to 1998, requirements regarding firm disclosure of these
governance practices were not overly stringent or well-defined. Although the regulations required a firm to disclose its compliance with the
recommended practices, they did not require firms to conform to a standardized format for such disclosure. A review of information circulars
during this period indicates that the extent and the format of the disclosure varied significantly, thus making it difficult to understand firms’
governance practices on a comparative basis. The situation changed in
1999 when TSX formally altered the disclosure requirements. With respect to information circulars issued for fiscal year 1999 and onward, the
TSX required that firms disclose their compliance with the recommended
practices in a standard tabular format. 22 As a result, 1999 marks the start
of the sample period. The TSX did not implement any significant
changes in disclosure requirements during the period of this study.
The voluntary guidelines from the Dey Committee remain the
foundation of the Canadian governance regime. The Dey Committee
guidelines are one of the earliest adoptions of corporate governance rules
among developed nations,23 but despite the relatively long history of the
Canadian guidelines, it is clear that corporate governance of Canadian
firms has the potential to be heavily influenced by the proximity of the
United States. The United States issued its first formal statement on corporate governance two years after the Dey Report, but substantial
changes to U.S. corporate governance practices have been made since
then. These changes culminated in 2002 with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
(SOX).24
The governance practices contained in SOX form an integral part of
the Canadian governance environment. This is due to two factors: first,
several Canadian firms have their shares listed on U.S. stock exchanges
and therefore are bound by SOX; and second, several non-cross-listed
22. In 1999, TSX stated that the disclosure should take a certain format. See Letter from Clare
Gaudet, Vice President Corporate Finance Services, Toronto Stock Exchange (Nov. 17, 1999) (on
file with authors).
23. Britain’s Cadbury Report was issued in late 1992. For more information on the Cadbury
Report, see THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE
FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/
documents/cadbury.pdf.
24. A comprehensive list of corporate governance codes by nation can be obtained from the
European Corporate Governance Institute, available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/.
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firms have begun to voluntarily adopt the requirements set out in SOX.25
In this study’s examination of the monitoring mechanisms that firms can
but are not required to adopt, elements from both the Dey Committee
guidelines and SOX are included.26
The sample period ends in 2003. After that date, cross-listed firms
were required to comply with SOX. By 2004, Canadian governance regulations also evolved to include some mandatory elements. Therefore,
2003 marks the last year when adoption of corporate governance mechanisms to assist the board in monitoring firm management was purely
voluntary.
For each of the five sample years, we reviewed the information circulars for firms in the TSX/S&P market index (formerly the TSE 300),
and we hand-collected the data on the governance mechanisms employed
by each firm. In total, we examined over 1200 proxy circulars.
B. Formally Defining Board Independence
Many of the guidelines suggested by the Dey Committee refer to
the board of directors and its role. Perhaps most importantly, the Dey
Committee recommended that the board should have a structure that
enables it to act independently from management. Recommended aspects of this structure include appointing a chair who is not a member of
the firm’s executive team and maintaining a majority of independent directors. Securities regulations require Canadian firms to include in their
proxy circulars details on the members of the board and their relation to
the firm with regard to whether they are “unrelated” or “independent.”
Independent directors are not involved in the firm management, whereas
unrelated directors are both independent and “free from any interest and
any business or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be
perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to act with a
view to the best interests of the corporation.”27
Thus, in our study, classifying each board member as “independent” involves a conservative approach that requires the director to be
both independent and unrelated to the firm. While the term “indepen25. Anita Anand, Frank Milne & Lynnette Purda, Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms, (Soc. Sci. Res. Network Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=921450.
26. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was officially passed in 2002, many of its recommendations did not immediately take effect. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002). In fact, none of the mechanisms that we examine were mandated for foreign firms for the
fiscal year of 2003, and therefore their adoption before this time was voluntary. Id. Of course,
Canadian firms with cross-listed securities may have begun to adopt these mechanisms in anticipation of required compliance. We address this issue in our robustness tests, infra Part IV.E.
27. See Dey Report, supra note 21; see also discussion infra Part III.D.
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dent” is used for brevity and consistency with the prior literature, it
should be noted that the term is used in the stricter sense of “unrelated”
as defined by the Dey Committee. Similarly, a board is defined as independent if it includes either a majority of independent directors or an independent chair.
The proportion of firms with independent boards remains relatively
constant over time. Table 1 examines the proportion of sample firms that
maintain an independent chair, a majority of independent directors, or
both, and the extent to which adoption of these features has altered from
1999 to 2003. The consistency of board independence is striking: the
proportion of boards with a majority of independent members fluctuated
only within a narrow range, moving from a low of 82.8% to a high of
87.4%. Even in 1999, the first year with standardized disclosure, over
80% of firms in the sample had boards with a majority of independent
directors. Panel A of Table 1 shows that across all years, 85% of firms
had boards with greater than 50% independent members. A T-test of the
difference in the level of majority independence between 1999 and 2003
fails to find a significant difference in the proportion of firms with independent boards between the first and last years of the sample.
Table 1 also reveals that it is far less common to maintain board independence through the presence of an independent chair. Only 36% of
observations across all years had independent chairs. However, this proportion has slowly but monotonically increased from a low of 32.7% in
1999 to high of 41.9% in 2003. Unlike the difference in the proportion
of firms with a majority of independent directors, the two proportions
stated above are statistically different from one another, which indicates
a significant change in the number of independent chairs over the fiveyear period.
In addition, almost all firms that maintain an independent chair also
choose to appoint a majority of independent directors. There is little difference in the sample proportions between firms that maintain independent chairs and those that ensure independence through the combination
of the majority of independent directors and an independent chair. Panel
B of Table 1 confirms this finding and shows that the presence of an independent chair without an independent board occurs in only 1.5% of the
sample. Furthermore, correlation between the presence of an independent chair and the presence of a combination of independent chair and a
majority of independent directors is in excess of 0.96.
Based on our research, it appears that having a majority of independent directors is almost a necessary condition for the appointment of an
independent chair. As a result, a board is defined to be independent if it
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includes either a majority of independent directors or an independent
chair.28
C. Shareholder Characteristics of Canadian Firms
The ownership structure of Canadian firms varies significantly. In
some cases, the Berle and Means view of widely held firms is an accurate description of Canadian corporations, but there are also a large number of family firms and firms with significant block holdings in our sample.29 Since the underlying shareholding characteristics of the firm are
likely to influence its propensity to maintain board independence and to
voluntarily adopt additional monitoring mechanisms, the presence of
block holdings, majority voters, and cross-listed firms is carefully controlled for by collecting shareholder information from the information
circulars of the firms studied.
We collected data on whether firms displayed certain characteristics
and the effect those characteristics had on whether the board adopted
voluntary monitoring mechanisms. Panel B of Table 2 provides a correlation matrix of five shareholding characteristics that may influence both
the propensity of a firm’s board to be independent and its likelihood to
voluntarily adopt the recommended corporate governance mechanisms:
the presence of family blocks, executive blocks, blocks owned by other
investors, and majority voters, as well as whether the firm’s shares are
cross-listed on a U.S. exchange.
Block holdings by firm executives, founding families, or other investors (generally institutions) must be distinguished from one another
because their roles in monitoring firm management may differ.30 For
instance, family block holders may have incentives to expropriate from
smaller shareholders, which implies that firms with family block holdings are less likely to adopt monitoring mechanisms.31 In contrast, block
holdings composed of institutional investors have been suggested to ac28. However, this essentially equates to maintaining a majority of independent directors because only sixteen of 1,078 sample firms maintained an independent chair without a majority of
independent directors.
29. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3. In Canada, securities regulations require disclosure of any
individual or group with 10% or more of the outstanding shareholder votes. See, e.g., Securities Act,
R.S.O., 1990, c.S.5, as amended, part XX, section 102.1 (Can).
30. It is also noteworthy that block holdings of one type are not associated with the presence of
block holdings of a different type. Correlations between three types of block holdings are all negative implications that firms maintaining insider block holdings by families or executives are less
likely to have significant holdings by institutional investors. This is true despite the fact that the
most common type of block holding within the sample is the “other” category, representing 44.84%
of observations, followed by the executive block at 18.69% and the family block at 14.85%.
31. See Ronald Anderson & David Reeb, Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in
S&P 500 Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 209 (2004).
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tively participate in monitoring firm management; this suggests a positive relation between voluntary adoption of these mechanisms and the
presence of these block holdings.32 The prediction for executive block
holdings is not clear; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny propose a non-linear
relation between managerial ownership and firm value, in which value
increases when management maintains a relatively small proportion of
shares but declines as managerial shareholdings become large and management becomes entrenched.33 Table 2 shows the likelihood of multiple
blocks and the relation between block types.34
A majority voter is defined as an individual or group who has control of over 50% of the firm’s votes. We speculate that the incentives for
these owners to voluntarily adopt additional corporate governance mechanisms will be low since the owners effectively have control of the
company and therefore have little need to please minority investors. In
stark contrast to the widely held view of the firm, 28.17% of the observations have a majority voter. The presence of these controlling shareholders is most strongly associated with the presence of family block holdings. Firms with majority voters are less likely to maintain independent
boards, as indicated by the correlation of -0.19 between these two characteristics.
In contrast, cross-listing in the United States may force firms to enhance their governance practices35 and to improve the quality of their
financial disclosures.36 Firms that are willing to subject themselves to
the increased scrutiny through cross-listing may thereby also be willing
to voluntarily adopt additional monitoring mechanisms. Table 2 shows
that 46.85% of sample observations are cross-listed and that cross-listed
firms are less likely to have block holdings of any type.
The widespread presence of significant block holdings, majority
voters, and cross-listed firms emphasizes the importance of controlling
32. See Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570–75
(1990).
33. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988).
34. Data is collected for all block holdings within a firm to incorporate cases where large
shareholdings are held by multiple groups, such as both a founding family and an institutional investor. There is no limit on the number of different kinds of block holdings that may be present. In
cases where a family member is also a member of management, the block holding is classified to be
an executive block.
35. See Andreas Charitou et al., Cross-Listing, Bonding Hypothesis and Corporate Governance, 34 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1286, 1294 (2007).
36. Mark Lang, Karl Lins & Darius Miller, ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing
in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J.
ACCT. RES. 317, 337 (2003); Mark Lang, Jana Raedy & Michelle Yetman, How Representative Are
Firms That Are Cross-Listed in the United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality, 41 J. ACCT.
RES. 363, 365 (2003).
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for their influence when establishing whether independent boards are
more likely to adopt certain governance mechanisms. This evidence also
points to the potential for these characteristics to influence the determination of board independence itself. Overall, 85% of the sample firms
maintained independent boards, and T-tests from Table 2 show that two
of the shareholding characteristics, cross-listings and other block holdings, are associated with significantly higher levels of independence than
the sample of firms without these characteristics. In contrast, the presence of a majority voter or block holdings by families and executives are
associated with significantly lower rates of board independence.37
D. Voluntary Monitoring Mechanisms
Canada’s voluntary monitoring mechanisms are contained in the
Dey Committee’s report.38 The Dey Report provided fourteen recommendations, or guidelines, with respect to the composition and function
of the board of directors. Of these recommendations, Guidelines 1 and
10 are most relevant in terms of outlining the board’s governance responsibilities. Guideline 1 charges the board of directors with the ultimate responsibility for the firm’s corporate governance: “The board of
directors of every corporation should explicitly assume responsibility for
the stewardship of the corporation.” Guideline 10 specifically recommends the formation of a governance committee: “Every board of directors should expressly assume responsibility for, or assign to a committee
of directors, the general responsibility for developing the corporation’s
approach to governance issues.” Three other guidelines recommend
practices to ensure that the board operates independently (including appointing the independent chair and a majority of independent directors)
and suggest disclosure related to each director’s affiliation with the company. Data relating to the remaining guidelines translated easily into
four observable monitoring mechanisms that can be coded by variables
equal to 1 if the company adopts the recommended practice and 0 otherwise. The precise guidelines examined are:
1. The audit committee is composed entirely of independent directors;
37. Not only do these tests point to the importance of controlling for shareholding characteristics in our analysis, they also make us aware of potential issues of multicollinearity and endogeneity.
38. Dey Report, supra note 21, at Guideline 12(i). The TSX adopted the Dey Report in February 1995, and on May 3, 1995, it released TSE By-Law 19.17, which requires companies incorporated in a Canadian jurisdiction and listed on the Exchange to make annual disclosures regarding
their corporate governance practices in an annual report or information circular. These guidelines
went into effect beginning with companies whose fiscal year ended on June 30, 1995. See Toronto
Stock Exchange, Guidelines, in TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 472 (2004) (listing the fourteen recommendations of the Dey Committee).
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2. The compensation committee is composed entirely of independent directors;
3. Directors are permitted to independently hire advisors; and
4. Formal training is provided for new board members.

The guidelines for which data has not been collected could not be
easily coded to reflect a voluntary willingness to enhance the board’s
monitoring capabilities. For instance, Guideline 7 recommends that the
board review its size to ensure that the board can operate effectively.
While it can potentially be deciphered whether or not this review has
taken place, a subjective judgment would have to be made as to whether
the outcome of the review enhanced, deteriorated, or left unchanged the
board’s ability to reduce agency costs.39 As a result, the analysis does
not include this recommendation.
In addition to these four mechanisms, we collected data for three
variables that emerged in SOX. Although these variables were prompted
by SOX and eventually became mandatory for Canadian firms with
cross-listed securities in the United States, early discussions in Canada
suggested that Canadian regulators viewed them favorably as well.40
Therefore, in keeping with our focus on recommended but not required
practices, we collected data on the following additional monitoring mechanisms, which again are easily observed and coded as 1 when adopted
and 0 otherwise. These are:
1. Adoption of a code of ethics;
2. Certification of financial statements; and
3. Presence of a financial expert on the audit committee.41

39. The remaining guidelines for which data was not collected include the following: a recommendation that the board develop position descriptions for directors and the CEO, that there should
be a process put in place for evaluating directors, and that the board should review its compensation
of directors.
40. These three monitoring mechanisms were to be contained in Canadian legislation proposed
in early 2004. To examine the request for comments regarding this initiative, see Request for Comment, available at http://www.msc.gov.mb.ca/legal_docs/legislation/notices/58_101notice.pdf. For
the final rules, see Multilateral Instrument 52-110: Audit Committees (2004), available at
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20040326_52-110-auditcomm.jsp; Multilateral Instrument 52-109: Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim
Filings (2004), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_
20040326_52-109-cert.jsp; National Policy 58-201, available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Secu
ritiesLaw_rule_20050617_58-201_corp-gov-guidelines.jsp. All of these instruments were proposed
in January 2004.
41. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act indicates that the Securities and Exchange Commission should
define financial expert and provides guidelines in developing that definition:

2010]

Monitoring to Reduce Agency Costs

823

While none of the sample firms were required to implement these
practices during the time period studied, Table 3 shows that a number of
the firms chose both to adopt and to voluntarily disclose the adoption of
these mechanisms. While Canadian disclosure requirements have been
standardized for the Dey recommendations, they do not encompass the
practices mandated by SOX. This may cause a downward bias in the
number of firms reporting adoption of the mandated practices. Presumably, however, if a firm believes that there are benefits to voluntarily implementing the practice, it is likely to reveal this to potential investors.42
We examined these seven mechanisms both individually and in aggregate through the formation of an index that allocates one point for
each mechanism adopted, up to a maximum of seven points. Creation of
such indices in corporate governance research is common,43 and no
judgment is made on the value of each recommended guideline, weighting each one equally. In addition to the full aggregate index, a second
index is defined, reflecting only the last five recommended guidelines. It
is plausible that the ability to staff committees exclusively with independent directors is mechanically related to the number and proportion of
independent directors available on the board. As a result, the first two
mechanisms related to audit and compensation committee composition
are excluded from the index to form a reduced index of voluntary adoption.
As a first observation, our results show that in the Canadian context, recommendations can be an effective means of encouraging firms to
adopt better governance practices. Table 3 provides a preliminary examination of the adoption of these seven mechanisms both across the
In defining the term ‘‘financial expert’’ for purposes of subsection (a), the Commission
shall consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal accounting
officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar functions—
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial
statements;
(2) experience in—
(A) the preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable issuers; and
(B) the application of such principles in connection with the accounting
for estimates, accruals, and reserves;
(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407(b), 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
42. Robustness tests ensure that the primary results are not sensitive to this assumption by
including only those mechanisms covered by disclosure guidelines.
43. See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON.
107 (2003); Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461 (2005).
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entire sample and on the basis of independent versus non-independent
boards. Overall, the average level of adoption is 3.91 mechanisms, with
independent boards adopting slightly more, at 4.02, and non-independent
boards adopting fewer—on average, 3.20.
Only a few firm-year observations have chosen not to implement
any of the seven recommended practices. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of index values across the sample for both the full index and the
reduced index excluding committee membership. Although adopting all
seven practices was also rare during the sample period, the most common
adoption level has been 5. For the reduced index, the number of mechanisms adopted most frequently is 3. However, in comparison to the
full index, a larger proportion of firms chose not to adopt any of the mechanisms, which may indicate a particular importance placed on committee membership. Table 3, which finds that maintaining an independent
audit committee is the most commonly adopted practice across the sample, confirms this observation.
While recommendations related to corporate governance have been
in place in Canada since 1995, increased focus on corporate governance
in recent years may have influenced firms to change their practices over
time. This possibility is examined in Figure 2, which plots the mean values for the full and reduced indices for both independent and nonindependent boards in each year of the sample. Three important observations can be made from this figure. First, even in 1999, firms were voluntarily adopting corporate governance regardless of whether they maintained independent boards. The average level of adopted mechanisms
was over 3 for independent boards and over 2 for non-independent
boards. Second, adoption rates have been increasing steadily across the
entire sample period. This is true for both the full and the reduced index
as well as for independent versus non-independent boards. Third, independent boards maintain a higher level of voluntary adoption across all
years of the sample for the full index. In recent years, however, adoption
rates for the reduced index have converged such that there appears to be
little difference between the behavior of independent and nonindependent boards.
Univariate tests of differences in adoption rates for independent and
non-independent firms across each of the seven mechanisms are provided in Table 3. In all cases, a significantly higher proportion of firms
with independent boards adopt specific recommendation. Because this
analysis does not account for differences in adoption rates over time,44 a

44. Figure 2 identifies differences in adoption rates over time as being potentially very important.
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more detailed multivariate analysis of adoption rates is required and is
described in the part below.

IV. MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS
To provide evidence of whether independent and non-independent
boards differ in their propensity to voluntarily adopt additional monitoring mechanisms, we conducted a multivariate analysis in which the dependent variable is either the full or the reduced index described above.
The independent variables include control variables and a measure of
board independence reflecting the presence of a majority of independent
directors or an independent chair. We also examined an alternative specification that includes a variable reflecting the presence of a majority of
independent directors and an interaction term identifying cases in which
both a majority of independent directors and an independent chair exist.45
The purpose of this term is to establish whether an independent chair
further enhances a board’s propensity to adopt recommended governance
practices when a majority of independent directors is already present.
A. Additional Control Variables
As we have seen, the shareholder characteristics of a firm may influence both the adoption of additional governance mechanisms and the
presence of an independent board. Accordingly, the multivariate analysis controls for the presence of block holdings (family, executive, or
“other”), a majority voter, and cross-listed shares. The expectation is
that governance adoption will be positively related to cross-listings and
other blocks, but negatively related to family blocks and majority voters.
The relationship is unclear with respect to executive holdings.
Six additional characteristics that arguably influence firms’ governance decisions are also included as independent variables. As evident
from Figure 2, governance patterns have changed dramatically over time;
therefore, a “Year Count” variable is defined and set equal to 0 in 1999,
1 in 2000 and so on until reaching a maximum value of 4 in 2003. In
addition, since many have argued that there are fixed costs associated
with implementing certain governance practices and that these costs are
therefore more onerous for small firms to bear, the size of the firm is
measured by the lagged value of the natural logarithm of total assets.
The remaining four control variables fall into two categories. The
first category aims to capture a firm’s need to appeal to either existing or
potential investors. The intuition is that the more a firm is potentially
45. Recall that there are extremely few cases in which an independent chair exists without a
majority of independent directors. See discussion, supra Part III.B.

826

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

dependent on investors for funds, the more it will attempt to demonstrate
that it values the interests of these investors by putting mechanisms in
place to ensure that their funds are not expropriated by management or
large shareholders. To measure the firm’s funding needs, two variables
are adapted from Durnev and Kim.46 The first variable, investment opportunity, is measured by the annual percentage growth in sales in the
year prior to the measurement of the governance indices. The second
variable measures the need for external finance, given a certain level of
investment opportunities, and is defined as the difference between the
firm’s sustainable growth rate and its actual growth rate.47 Any amount
of growth that the firm cannot support on its own must be funded by external sources. Both investment opportunities and the need for external
funds are expected to be positively related to a firm’s voluntary adoption
of governance mechanisms.
The final category of control variables relates to the potential size
of the agency costs experienced by the firm. Recall that these costs incorporate uses of cash that are inconsistent with the best interests of
shareholders and expenses incurred to prevent these uses. Gompers and
Lerner argue that agency problems will be greater when assets are intangible because tangible assets can be more easily sold upon liquidation
of the firm and therefore require less monitoring.48 In a similar vein,
Khanna argues that high levels of research and development (R&D)
spending may be consistent with over-spending due to managerial empire building, while Durnev and Kim argue that these expenses proxy for
the intangibility of corporate resources and therefore, for greater potential agency costs.49
In line with this literature, our study includes two measures of asset
tangibility as control variables. The first is the value of property, plants,
and equipment scaled by total assets, which is expected to be negatively
related to the level of voluntary adoption. Firms with tangible assets
need not expend significant resources to monitor these assets. The
second is R&D expenses scaled by total assets, which is expected to be

46. Durnev & Kim, supra note 43, at 1464.
47. Following Demirgüç–Kunt and Maksimovic, sustainable growth is measured as return on
equity/(1 - return on equity), and actual growth is measured as the annual growth rate in total assets.
These values are taken from the year prior to the measurement of the governance variables. See Asli
Demirgüç–Kunt & Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance, and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 2107, 2110–11
(1998).
48. PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 164 (MIT Press 2004);
Durnev & Kim, supra note 43.
49. Arun Khanna, Managerial Ownership and Firm Value: Agency Problems of Empire Building and Overvalued Equity at 12 (May 6, 2005), available at http://www.fma.org/SLC/Papers/Ma
nagerialOwnership3.pdf; Durnev & Kim, supra note 43, at 1474.
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positively related to the number of additional monitoring mechanisms
adopted. 50
Table 4 provides summary statistics for these control variables and
their expected relation to the voluntary adoption of monitoring mechanisms. Because of potential endogeneity issues between financial characteristics and governance practices, all variables are measured in the year
prior to measuring the indices of voluntary adoption. Panel A of the table provides the mean value for each variable for the full sample, its first
and ninety-ninth percentiles, and average values across both independent
and non-independent boards. T-statistics for differences in the values of
these variables across board type are also presented.
There are no systematic differences in the need for funds, asset tangibility, or size across the two sub-samples of firms. Although the average value of market to book for firms with both board types does not enter into the analysis as a control variable, the table also reports it. Market-to-book value has commonly been used as the measure of overall
firm performance,51 and within this sample, there is no systematic difference in its value across boards with independent versus non-independent
firms, providing further evidence on the difficulty of establishing a consistent link between governance and performance.
Panel B of Table 4 provides pair-wise correlations among the control variables related to size, year, need for funds, and asset tangibility.
The strongest relation is the negative correlation between R&D expenses
and firm size. This indicates that the R&D variable may be capturing
relatively young start-up firms that are still small in size. Significantly,
positive association between investment opportunity and R&D is also
consistent with the rapid growth experienced by junior firms. In contrast, size is negatively related to investment opportunities but positively
related to the need for external finance, which indicates that larger firms
have slowed in their year-to-year sales growth but remain heavily dependent on external capital markets for finance.
Our study collected data for the control variables from the Canadian
version of the Compustat database. Despite the fact that the sample includes only firms contained in the S&P/TSX index—the primary market
index for Canada—not all firms are included in the database, and for
some firms, the data is incomplete. Moving to the multivariate analysis
50. Research and development expenses are frequently missing for observations in Compustat.
Rather than eliminating observations with missing data, we follow Durnev and Kim’s practice of
replacing missing R&D observations with a value of 0. The logic behind this is that firms that fail to
report R&D may do so because they do not have R&D expenditures. Eliminating these firms would
then bias the sample toward industries whose R&D spending is significant. Durnev & Kim, supra
note 43, at 1477.
51. See Gompers et al., supra note 43, at 151; Klein et al., supra note 1.
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therefore results in a loss of observations. However, approximately 700
observations remain.
B. Model Specification
The empirical specification linking the index that reflects monitoring mechanisms to the dependent variables can take several forms.
While the data contains elements of a panel in that it represents a crosssection of firms over five years, it is a highly unbalanced panel. Not all
firms have available data for each year, and the average number of times
a firm appears in the sample is only 2.6. When a firm appears multiple
times in the sample, it is clear that its level of governance adoption in
one year is likely to be correlated with its level in other years. This correlation can be modeled by using either a random effects model52 or robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. A significant number of
assumptions underlie the random effects model, and the Hausman test
rejects its use. Therefore, our study uses clustered standard errors that
are robust to the presence of any correlation among observations from
the same firm.
The use of clustered standard errors permits a more accurate representation of the dependent variable by using an ordered probit model.
Ordered probit models are appropriate for models with discrete dependent variables when these variables are inherently ranked from low to
high, which is consistent with the constructed governance indices.53
C. Primary Results
Table 5 provides the first multivariate results relating monitoring
mechanisms to board independence, shareholding characteristics, and the
additional control variables. The columns of the table are divided into
three sections. The first section provides the expected relation between
each independent variable and the index reflecting voluntary adoption of
monitoring mechanisms. The second section measures board independence using our primary composite measure, including firms with either
a majority of independent directors or an independent chair. Finally, the
third section replaces this independence definition with a distinct measure of majority independence and the interaction term that identifies
firms with both majority independence and an independent chair.

52. A random effects model (versus a fixed effects model) is appropriate when we believe the
sampled cross-sectional units were drawn from a large population. See WILLIAM GREENE,
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1997). Because the sample includes only 268 individual companies, we believe that this is a consistent representation of the data.
53. GREENE, supra note 52.
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Because Table 2 identified shareholding characteristics to be correlated with the adoption of an independent board, these characteristics are
initially excluded to avoid potential issues of multicollinearity. Under
the first specification of the model presented in Table 5, the full index of
potential monitoring mechanisms ranging from 0 to 7 is the dependent
variable within the ordered probit model, and the second specification
uses the reduced index. The number of observations increases slightly
when moving to the reduced index because for some observations, it is
impossible to establish if the audit and compensation committees were
fully independent; thus, the full index could not be created. Under both
specifications, all included control variables (with the exception of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E)) are estimated with the correct sign.
Surprisingly, PP&E shows a significant positive relation with the adoption of additional monitoring mechanisms, implying that firms with more
tangible assets are more likely to adopt these mechanisms. In contrast,
R&D shows the expected sign and is significant for the full index, which
implies that firms with high levels of R&D and more intangible resources are more likely to protect these resources with additional monitoring.
One possible explanation for counter-results for PP&E is that the
variable is proxying for an omitted variable, such as industry effects. We
confirm this hypothesis by constructing thirteen dummy variables corresponding to the thirteen industry classifications established by Campbell from 2-digit sic codes.54 When these variables are included, the
PP&E variable becomes insignificant, while all other variables remain
qualitatively similar. The R&D variable, however, maintains its significance even with the industry dummies at a slightly reduced 6% significance level rather than the original 3%.55
The control variables most significantly related to the adoption of
monitoring mechanisms are the size of the firm, the year of observation,
and the need for finance. As expected, larger firms and firms in greater
need of external funds adopt more governance mechanisms. Although
the relation between need for finance and monitoring mechanisms retains
its statistical significance, it is stronger when the full index is examined
than when the reduced index excluding committee composition is likewise examined.
54. John Campbell, Understanding Risk and Return, 104 J. POL. ECON. 298, 316 (1996).
55. We also verified that the inclusion of industry dummies does not substantially alter the
results from the full regression, including both financial and ownership characteristics. While the
results in these instances are essentially the same, we chose not to incorporate industry dummies in
the reported tables because subsequent tests work with significantly smaller subsamples of the data,
and the inclusion of these dummies would have the potential to over-identify the model.
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Having established that the control variables largely behave as expected, we turn to the key variable under consideration: board independence. We observe that the role of board independence is highly sensitive to monitoring mechanisms. When the index representing seven potential mechanisms forms the dependent variable, board independence is
positively related to adoption of these mechanisms at the 1% level. In
contrast, when the two variables related to independent committees are
dropped from the analysis, independent boards are seen to be no more
likely to voluntarily adopt the remaining five monitoring mechanisms.
The remaining columns in Table 5 confirm this pattern and the special role that board independence plays in ensuring independent board
committees. The third and fourth sets of coefficient estimates add the
shareholder characteristics to the control variables and repeat the estimation of the ordered probit model. Before doing so, however, an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression is estimated including all eleven controls
(two related to tangibility and two related to need for funds, year, size,
and five shareholding characteristics). Strictly speaking, OLS is not appropriate for discrete ordered dependent variables; however, OLS estimation allows for the calculation of variance inflation factors to establish
the extent to which multicollinearity impacts the model’s estimation.
Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price suggest that multicollinearity is a problem
whenever the largest variance inflation factor exceeds 10 or the average
of all factors is significantly greater than 1.56 For the variables used here,
the average value is 1.17, while the largest factor is only 1.38, thus providing little indication of multicollinearity. As a result, all control variables are simultaneously incorporated into the analysis.57
Including all variables confirms many of our previous findings.
Size, year, and PP&E are all significantly positively related to monitoring mechanisms, regardless of whether the full or the reduced index is
used. However, inclusion of industry dummies eliminates the significance of PP&E. More importantly, however, is the confirmation that
board independence is again positive and significant only when the full
index of monitoring mechanisms is examined; board independence plays
56. See SAMPRIT CHATTERJEE, ALI S. HADI & BERTRAM PRICE, REGRESSION ANALYSIS BY
EXAMPLE (3d ed. 2000) (1977).
57. In addition to testing for multicollinearity, we considered the possibility of a two-stage
instrumental variable regression. Under this specification, board independence would be predicted
by instruments correlated with independence, but unrelated to corporate governance mechanisms.
Board size was considered as a potential instrument based on the findings of Vassallo and Wells that
larger boards are more likely to be independent; however, in the current sample, size was found to be
unreliably related to independence. Vasallo & Wells, Firms’ Information Environments and Board
Independence (Soc. Sci. Res. Network Working Paper, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898065.
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no role in establishing the propensity to adopt the reduced index excluding committees.
Additional insights gained from incorporating the shareholding characteristics include the importance of cross-listing shares in the United
States and the presence of a majority voter. As expected, these variables
have opposite effects, with cross-listings being positively and significantly related to the adoption of additional monitoring mechanisms and the
presence of a majority voter negatively influencing this adoption. Interestingly, the majority voter variable shares a similar pattern to board
independence in that it is only a significant influence on governance for
the full index when committee membership is included and fails to be
important as a determinant of the reduced index.
The final two model specifications in Table 5 confirm the role of
control variables in that size, year, cross-listings, majority voter, and
need for finance retain their significance. All other control variables remain insignificant. What is different in these final specifications, however, is that the incremental value of an independent chair when a majority of independent directors is already in place is established by including both a variable identifying a majority of independent directors
and an interaction term for cases in which an independent chair also exists. These specifications make it apparent that the role of independence
is highly sensitive to the precise governance mechanisms reviewed.
Both measures are positively and significantly related to the full index,
with the presence of an independent chair providing significant incremental benefit over and above the importance of majority independence.
In contrast, neither is important when the reduced index is examined.
D. Examining Committee Membership
It is clear from the analysis in Table 5 that board independence does
not play a consistent role in influencing the adoption of various monitoring mechanisms. For this reason, the seven mechanisms are considered
individually in Table 6 using a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a particular mechanism is adopted and to 0 otherwise.
The same set of control variables are used as in Table 5.
In general, moving from an aggregate index to its individual elements reduces the significance of many of the control variables. However, year of observation remains a powerful predictor of adoption across
all mechanisms. This implies that increases in the aggregate index level
over time are not merely due to the adoption of more recently introduced
mechanisms suggested by SOX, but rather are due to an overall increase
in the level of adoption across all governance practices. Size retains its
significance across approximately half of the mechanisms, with a code of

832

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

ethics, financial certification, and a financial expert on the audit committee being more common for larger firms.
In examining monitoring mechanisms individually, two unique
findings are apparent. First, the presence of an independent board is significantly related only to committee independence. While positively related to both audit and compensation committee independence at the 1%
level, board independence is an insignificant determinant of all other
monitoring mechanisms. Second, the presence of a majority voter plays
a distinct role in whether committees are staffed with independent directors. For both audit and compensation committees, the presence of a
controlling shareholder makes it less likely that committees are independent. For all other monitoring mechanisms, the majority voter variable is
insignificant.
The unique relationship between board independence and committee membership warrants an investigation into whether this relationship
is purely mechanical because firms with more independent directors necessarily have more independent members available from whom to choose
in staffing committees. Table 7 addresses this issue and provides additional information on the dynamics of committee memberships over time
by detailing the proportion of firms that had fully independent audit and
compensation committees in each year of the sample for both firms with
independent boards and those without.
The first observation from Table 7 is the dramatic historical difference in committee composition between independent and nonindependent boards. In 1999, 72.68% of firms with independent boards
maintained fully independent audit committees. However, this proportion was only 17.65% for non-independent boards. A dramatic difference was also apparent for the compensation committee, with 62.64% of
independent boards maintaining independent committees, compared to
23.53% of non-independent boards.
Examining the dynamics of how these committee compositions
have changed over time sheds some light on whether firms with nonindependent boards are unable to fully staff committees with independent
members, either because boards have a shortage of these members or
because boards have the capability to form independent committees but
simply choose not to. Investigation of audit committee composition
shows that fully independent committees have become far more common
for both types of boards. However, the difference in the proportion of
firms with independent audit committees in 1999 versus 2003 is statistically significant for both groups. For firms with independent boards, this
proportion has increased from 72.68% to 93.05%. While this still significantly exceeds the proportion of non-independent boards, the gap is
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much smaller in 2003 than in 1999, when the proportion of independent
boards adopting this mechanism was greater by over 55%. In just five
years, the proportion of non-independent boards choosing to staff the
audit committee solely with independent members has increased from
17.65% to 69.57%. Clearly, non-independent boards have the capacity
to staff this committee with independent members if they so choose, with
close to 70% making this decision in 2003.
In contrast, the data regarding compensation committees has not
demonstrated such a dramatic change. While the proportion of nonindependent boards with independent compensation committees has increased from 1999 to 2003, this increase is not statistically significant,
nor has it been monotonic across all years. The proportion of nonindependent boards adopting this mechanism had a low of 23.53% in
1999, peaked in 2001 at 40%, and then declined to 30.43% in 2003. In
all years, independent boards are significantly more likely to maintain
independent compensation committees with the proportion of adopters
ranging from 62.64% to 81.38%. It is apparent that non-independent
boards place a much lower priority on maintaining an independent compensation committee than an independent audit committee. Independent
boards have historically viewed both to be important; because of this,
independent boards continue to increase their adoption rates of both mechanisms.
E. Robustness Tests
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of the results to sample
selection. More specifically, we examine the roles of two key characteristics that may influence a firm’s propensity to voluntarily adopt additional monitoring mechanisms: first, whether the firm has shares crosslisted on an American exchange, and second, whether the firm has a majority voter. Cross-listing may unduly influence voluntary adoption of
governance mechanisms related to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. While none
of the mechanisms examined here were mandatory for firms within the
sample period, firms may have begun adopting them in the expectation
that they may become compulsory. Support for this suggestion can be
seen in Table 6, in which cross-listing is positively and significantly associated with the individual adoption of independent audit committees,
compensation committees, and financial certification. All three of these
mechanisms are reforms contained in SOX.58 A more stringent test of
our hypothesis on the influence of independent boards on monitoring
mechanisms would therefore exclude cross-listed firms from the analy58. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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sis, focusing only on those firms influenced solely by Canadian standards
and regulations.59
Table 8 provides the results of this more stringent test, again examining both the full and the reduced indices. Our findings are very similar to Table 5. For instance, the year of observation is again seen to be
an important determinant of monitoring mechanisms and, for the full index, investment opportunity and the need for external finance retain their
significantly positive relation to monitoring. Interestingly, firm size is no
longer an important influence on monitoring. However, this result may
not be surprising after noting that only the largest Canadian firms choose
to cross-list in the United States, and the median size of cross-listed firms
in the sample is over 1.5 times that of the median size of non-cross-listed
firms.
Turning to the role of independent boards of non-cross-listed firms,
we document findings similar to those of the sample as a whole. Again,
independent boards positively influence the value of the full index, including committee memberships. This is an impressive finding because
firms listed solely in Canada have not faced the same impending requirement to alter the composition of these committees. In a purely voluntary environment, it appears that independent boards are exerting significant influence on the composition of committee memberships. The
findings here also confirm that board independence has no influence on
the reduced index when committees are excluded from the analysis.
The second subsample analyzed in Table 8 includes only firms
without a majority voter. The motivation behind this subsample comes
from the observation that majority voters occur in a non-trivial portion of
the sample (28.17%), and Table 5 documents that the presence of a majority voter is negatively associated with the level of the full index but
not with the level of the reduced index. Table 6, in which the majority
voter variable is significantly and negatively associated with the formation of independent committees, gives further support for the influence of
a controlling shareholder. Although independent boards advocate inde59. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act adds an additional potential complication to the analysis: no
standardized format for disclosure exists for firms to reveal whether they have voluntarily undertaken to adopt the measures implied by the Act. As a result, it is possible that some firms have chosen
to adopt these measures without disclosing that they have done so. To the extent that this occurs, our
analysis is based on disclosed governance adoption rather than on the true, potentially unobservable
adoption rates. This is not an issue for the mechanisms recommended by the Dey Report, for which
consistent disclosure standards existed throughout the sample period. The main findings are supported by the individual analysis of these mechanisms in Table 6, where it can be seen that independent boards primarily exert influence on the adoption of monitoring mechanisms through committee
memberships and have limited impact on other mechanisms. This conclusion holds even when
confining the analysis to include only mechanisms with standardized disclosure.
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pendent audit and compensation committees, controlling shareholders
appear opposed to their formation.
The findings change within this subsample, which implies an interesting dynamic between the board of directors and controlling shareholders. While the control variables behave as in previous results, the role of
an independent board strengthens when a majority voter is not present.
In this subsample, independent boards are again associated with higher
adoption rates for the full index; however, they are also able to exert a
positive influence on the reduced index, in which only those mechanisms
not pertaining to committee membership are included. The results are
therefore sensitive to the presence of a majority voter. When a majority
voter is not present, independent boards are more likely to voluntarily
adopt a wide range of monitoring mechanisms. When a controlling
shareholder is present, however, the board has a reduced ability to adopt
these mechanisms and appears to focus its efforts on ensuring that committee membership includes only independent directors—a mechanism
to which controlling shareholders are particularly opposed.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Using hand-collected data from over 1200 proxy circulars for Canadian firms, this study has examined the hypothesis that independent
boards are more inclined than non-independent boards to voluntarily
adopt mechanisms designed to enhance their ability to monitor firm
management. Independent boards have been defined as those with either
a majority of independent directors, where the term “independent” is taken to mean both independent and unrelated, or an independent chair. The
observations suggest that in almost all cases, the presence of an independent chair coincides with a majority of independent directors.
Relying on the ordered probit methodology, the primary results
suggest that independent boards place special importance on maintaining
board committees staffed exclusively with independent directors and that
their ability to voluntarily adopt other monitoring mechanisms is sensitive to the presence of a controlling shareholder. When a controlling
shareholder is not present, independent boards are able to adopt additional monitoring mechanisms of all types.
These conclusions are robust to controlling for the shareholding
characteristics of the firm, its need for funds, and the tangibility of its
assets. In general, the year of the observation, the firm size, and whether
the company has shares listed on a U.S. stock exchange play a large role
in establishing the propensity of a firm to adopt monitoring mechanisms,
with more recent observations, large firms, and those with U.S. crosslistings scoring higher on both indices of adoption. Formal tests of mul-
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ticollinearity, alternative model specifications, and a more stringent test
of the hypothesis in the context of only non-cross-listed firms do not
change the results.
The theoretical motivation underlying the study is agency theory
and the traditional view of the role of the board of directors. Traditionally, the board of directors actively monitors decision-makers who have a
tendency to divert firm resources to their own best interests. The results
support this view and provide evidence that a non-trivial number of recommended monitoring mechanisms have been adopted by firms and that
the adoption rate is increasing for firms with both independent and nonindependent boards. Nevertheless, a potential limitation of the study is
that it does not incorporate alterative views for the board of directors,
such as influencing managerial decisions through an advisory role. In
addition, it ignores processes other than board monitoring that may serve
to reduce agency costs.60 Finally, it confines its consideration of monitoring mechanisms to those formally suggested either by Canadian
guidelines or by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, placing equal weight on each
of the chosen mechanisms despite the fact that some may be more effective than others.
Despite these limitations, the study makes several valuable contributions. First, it provides evidence on the effectiveness of nonmandatory governance guidelines. Despite the fact that there is no requirement for firms to adopt the recommended guidelines, the evidence
shows that a number of firms do.61 Second, the study provides insights
into board behavior and the processes boards follow rather than focusing
on the inconclusive role of the board in influencing firm performance.
Although previous literature on boards and performance has been extensive, it has provided few concrete insights. This study takes an alternative approach by shedding light on board dynamics and the influence that
boards have on governance mechanisms, which may in turn influence
performance. In doing so, the study provides several possible explanations for the inconclusive findings relating performance to board independence, and it therefore points to future avenues for academic research. For instance, there appears to be little difference in the adoption
rate across boards of either type for several monitoring mechanisms.
This suggests that a possible explanation for a lack of difference in per60. See Kenneth Rediker & Anju Seth, Boards of Directors and Substitution Effects of Alternative Governance Mechanisms, 16 STRAT. MGMT. J. 85, 97–98 (1995).
61. While this result is clear in the Canadian context, one should exercise caution in extending
these findings to developing economies. See Maria Krambia–Kapardis & Jim Psaros, The Implementation of Corporate Governance Principles in an Emerging Economy: A Critique of the Situation in Cyprus, 14 CORP. GOV.: INT’L. REV. 126 (2006).
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formance is that both kinds of boards are behaving similarly with respect
to their actions: there is no difference because behavior is the same.
Alternatively, in cases where there is evidence that independent
boards do behave differently, such as the adoption of an independent audit committee, finding no difference in performance may suggest that
this particular monitoring mechanism contributes little to the firm’s ultimate performance. This could be the case if the mechanism is so excessively costly to implement that any gain from enhanced monitoring is
eliminated by this expense. This expense may be monetary in nature, but
it may also be a reduction in the board’s effectiveness as advisors; for
example, a board’s effectiveness may be reduced if management is unwilling to provide sensitive information to a board with tendencies toward overzealous monitoring.62
In addition to these academic contributions and suggestions for future research, the study has significant implications for policymakers
advocating for independent boards. Perhaps most important is that the
presence of an independent board does not guarantee enhanced compliance with all recommended practices. Board independence appears to
have a very specific influence on the types of practices adopted, primarily those related to committee membership, and its influence may be
dampened by the presence of a controlling shareholder. These results
help to address our gap in understanding “the conditions under which
regulation of boards will lead to improvements” identified by Hermalin
and Weisbach,63 and these results also force regulators to make explicit
what they hope to achieve by recommending or mandating independent
boards.

62. Adams & Ferreira, supra note 12, at 218.
63. Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 7–26 (2003).
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